Types of CSR approaches
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is not a new phenomenon (Segal et al 2002; Sobczak 2003) . In early industrial societies of the 18 th century, before the emergence of the welfare state, some private, paternalistic enterprises internalised responsibilities for their employees, often on the basis of an unwritten social contract (social security in return for loyalty). Motives for CSR were often both religious and ethical beliefs of the owner or fear of labour unrest and radicalism.
Once again, albeit with different motives and substances, CSR is in vogue. It has become one of the cherished buzzwords and expectations of modern business management in post-industrial economies. Some governments are pushing hard to relieve the public sector of some of its former burdens and to forge public-private partnerships. The EU is appealing to the European business community to take on board CSR. Political consumers are on the rise staking new demands on private firms. It seems that modern business managers are under stakeholder siege.
CSR is defined by the European Commission as "a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis" (European Commission 2002, p. 3). The concept of CSR is
nonetheless vague, ambiguous and multidimensional. To provide some clarification, CSR initiatives can be classified as either emanating from the bottom-up (enterprises as initiators) or from the top-down (governments as initiators) and according to their focus, either on societal responsibility or on labour market responsibilities. 1 Four types of CSR, which should not be seen as mutually exclusive, can then be identified:
1 In focussing on the initiators of CSR and the substance of CSR initiatives, an advantage of the typology is that it allows for comparisons of CSR between different national labour market and welfare regimes. When CSR is defined as voluntary business initiatives on top of national laws and regulations, the possibilities for cross-country comparisons are invalidated, since differences between national welfare and employment regimes in Europe are immense. What count as voluntary social responsibilities in one country, is often considered a legal obligation in another country. Denmark, which provides the case study for this article, is an example of the type four government-driven approach to CSR, which is narrowly focussed on labour market responsibilities. CSR was launched as an official government program in 1994. A number of political and social initiatives were taken from the top-down and involved decentralised actors in public-private partnerships. The main policy objectives have been to improve labour market integration for the marginalized and long-term unemployed and to reduce workplace exclusion.
Since the initiative came from the political-administrative system in Denmark, rather than the business community, the Danish case allows for a discussion of the role of the public sector in CSR, a discussion that has generally been neglected in mainstream CSR literature.
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As a government program, CSR creates new reciprocal relations between public authorities and private enterprises. This paper address the question of how instrumental links can be established between public policy and enterprise policy. The Danish case shows some of the possibilities and limitations of (soft) government intervention into the operations and behaviour of private enterprises. The main question is how links can be forged between public policy instruments and business interests to alleviate labour market problems in a voluntary manner and without undermining the capitalist market dynamic. To understand links between public policy and enterprise policy we cannot rely on traditional interpretations of politics and society, where state and market are often seen a functionally opposed logics. We need to construct an alternative and integrated theoretical framework that, on the one hand, identifies the way public policymakers construct programs to influence the business community by other means than 'command-and-control' regulation and, on the other hand, opens up for understanding private enterprises as more than rational agents motivated by short-term profit gains. Such a framework is proposed in this paper.
From the perspective of a universal welfare state, CSR is about making the business community responsible for problems, which traditionally have been regarded as public responsibilities, e.g. The paper is organised in two parts. First, the special nature and characteristics of CSR as a government program in Denmark is described, second, an analytical framework for linking public policy programs and business interests is presented. An important conclusion is that acknowledging the different roles, programs and policy instruments available to the state and public authorities transcend the dichotomy between voluntarism and coercion, characterising much CSR debate. Voluntary CSR create free-rider problems, sporadic adoption and easily develops into a marketing exercise for the business community, which will not alleviate common societal problems. 'Command-and-control' regulated CSR would make the business community negative opponents, rather than positive partners. The paper suggests other types of policy instruments transcending the dichotomy. But CSR was exactly created upon the tradition for self-and co-regulation on the labour market and, thus, respect for the professional autonomy of both social partners and the enterprises.
The Danish case: CSR between labour market policy and business
As in other countries, the state did not use traditional 'command-and-control' regulation to enforce CSR. Public authorities therefore had to persuade the business community to take on board CSR, making them realise that social responsibility was a 'common concern' among all relevant stakeholders (the public sector, the enterprises, local communities, voluntary associations, unions etc.) (cf. Rosdahl 2002) . From the outset it was stressed that CSR did not involve quota schemes or sanctions to force enterprises to participate. Voluntarism became the main principle. The objective of public campaigns was, therefore, to raise the awareness among enterprises that it was in their own interest to take on board social responsibilities, hitherto the responsibility of the public sector. Adequate voluntary business action would ward off the risk of public intervention (cf. Haufler 2001) . 3 The main messages of the CSR policy program are illustrated in this quote from a former senior civil servant in the Ministry of Social Affairs:
"The public sector will have the final responsibility; participation must be voluntary; a close cooperation among partners must be established; everyone must gain; the public authorities must be able to service the enterprises" (Bakdal 1995: 209) .
The quote suggests that CSR does not result in private enterprises taking over former public responsibilities, but only that enterprises are applying their comparative advantage in assisting the public and the society in relieving problems of workplace exclusion and unemployment. The responsibility of public authorities is to lay down a framework where it becomes possible and attractive to act in a socially responsible manner.
We now have a first indication of the objectives of CSR as a government program and the main strategy for implementation. But where did CSR come from and which political and societal problems were CSR seen as a solution to? To answer this question we need to understand the labour market situation in Denmark in the early 1990s and how it changed in the later part of the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, unemployment had reached historical highs at 12% of the labour force and social expenditures for sickness leave and pre-pension were described as 'exploding'. There was widespread fear of 'dropping a whole generation on the floor', which due to persistent unemployment, lack of qualifications and the negative psychological consequences of unemployment would possibly never be integrated on the labour market. Political worries were mounting that the employment crisis would result in a 'two-third' society, meaning that one third of the population were permanently excluded from employment and the labour market, which would possibly lead to a breakdown of solidarity between the hard-working middle-classes and the unemployed (blaming the victim) and thus further compound the financial crisis of the universal welfare state (Social Commission 1993).
CSR was in this context pushed forward to tackle immediate social policy problems of rising social expenditures and as a way to forge a new alliance behind the universal welfare state. CSR was seen as an element in the strategy to create a more Inclusive Labour Market (ILM). A more inclusive labour market with 'room and use for everyone' is a political vision for a less segmented and less polarised labour market in which public-private partnerships are forged to avoid workplace exclusion and long-term unemployment. The initial idea was to establish a 'third labour market' that could act as a 'transitional phase' and give the unemployed some work experiences, self-confidence and renewed qualifications by job-training, education and subsidised jobs on special conditions. As a political strategy, the ILM was the compromise reached by the dominant labour market actors to counter more radical demands for work sharing and a universal citizens wage scheme. has changed in line with this improvement of labour market conditions. The overriding aim is now to increase effective labour supply.
5
Interestingly enough, CSR and the ILM has stayed on top of the policy agenda and managed to survive the changing perception of policy problems. This can be explained by the elasticity and plasticity of the concepts making them suitable to target different problem definitions and policy agendas. It also reflect the fact there is seldom a causal relationships in political decision-making between problem definitions, problem solutions and policy effects (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984) .
CSR has now been rephrased as a program to activate the 'latent labour supply' and to avoid future lack of labour supply. Shifting from 'passive' to 'active' employment policies, public expenditures on income support are expected to decline and the revenue base of the welfare state to increase. As a public policy, CSR has shifted from social policy towards employment and economic policy, 6 which makes the business case for CSR essential in convincing, persuading and re-orienting enterprises to take on board CSR. In this economic universe two interrelated arguments for the rationality of CSR are often put forward:
(1) Stakeholder approach: With economic globalisation, new ICT and media exposure a broader range of actors than shareholders and employees have a stake in the decisions of enterprises and should be involved accordingly. The wider range of actors, like sub-contractors, consumers, public authorities and NGOs, are presumed to be predisposed for enterprises acting in a socially and environmentally responsible manner (cf. Freeman 1984) . Social responsibility can then be used in public relations to gain a better image and reputation in front of stakeholders.
In the final analysis, this will come out on the economic bottom line. The main weakness of 5 Even despite the fact that employment conditions have worsened considerably since late 2002, and the unemployment rate have now started to climb again (from 4,5% in the second quarter of 2002 to 5,6% in the second quarter of 2003). The government is therefore currently at pains trying to convince the public that the strategy of increasing effective labour supply is still on the mark and that the unemployment situation is only temporary and soon the demographic composition of the workforce (with smaller youth cohorts and large shares of the workforce around the retirement age) will result in lack of labour supply. 6 This shift is also reflected in the fact that the new liberal-conservative government when assuming office in late 2001 moved the policy areas of CSR and the ILM from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Employment.
stakeholder theory, however, is that it presents a universal theory of the firm supposedly applicable to all types of enterprises. We still need to contextualise the theory and determine its relevance for types of enterprises, markets and environments. The assumption would be that stakeholder theory is most relevant for knowledge intensive and modern enterprises, which are dependent on a 'good' public image and 'high' ethical standards. In this light is should not come as a surprise that existing economic and management research so far has been inconclusive in identifying an empirical correlation between CSR and economic performance (cf. Griffin and Mahone 1997; Siegel 2000, 2001) . The line of causation is also unclear: Does firms behave in a socially responsible manner because they are economically successful or do they become economically successful because they behave in a socially responsible manner?
(2) The second economic argument for CSR is clearly related to the stakeholder argument and focus on the direct economic returns from corporate social performance. Enterprises performing internal social responsibilities will in return get more committed, loyal and productive employees and a larger recruitment base. Consumers, investors, public authorities and civil society organisations will positively acknowledge enterprises marketing their CSR practices. Even external social responsibility will (in theory) create direct economic returns. A necessary condition is that public authorities provide economic subsidies to enterprises (or the person). When labour supply is scarce, firms will, in addition, have a natural interest in increasing effective labour supply by integrating unemployed who are not as effective or experienced as the core labour force. Thus, CSR can be 'sold' to the business community as being in the short-and long-term economic interests of enterprises and not only as a question of 'correct' political and normative attitudes. Yet the adoption of CSR policies by the business community is very much an article of 'faith and conviction' rather than hard empirical evidence.
We have now briefly described the when, what and why of CSR in Denmark, and need to consider whom the concept cover. In Denmark, the target group covers everything from mentally or physically handicapped, senior citizens, ethnic minorities, the unskilled, the long-term unemployed and persons in rehabilitation or pre-pension schemes. In brief: Everyone who is not 100% effective! Many of these groups have previously only to a limited extent been targeted by active labour market and social policy. But public authorities cannot reach the target groups directly. Policymakers and administrators must act indirectly through the assistance and 'good will' of the enterprises. That presumes some element of harmony between public policy instruments and the behavioural and attitudinal dispositions of private enterprises (cf. the next section). A three-pronged relationship between public authorities, enterprises and the target groups emerges, which makes target group intervention more difficult than in traditional policy program, where there is a direct relationship between public authorities and target groups.
Therefore, traditional 'command-and-control' regulation was not seen as appropriate. CSR in Municipal authorities in turn receive a state reimbursement of 65% of expenditures for flex-jobbers, which should make it an attractive financial option compared to rehabilitation (50% state reimbursement) and pre-pension (35% state reimbursement). Soft-jobs are provided for persons already receiving social pensions (i.e. pre-pension). Currently around 20.000 flexible jobs have been created -primarily in the public sector -and with a rather sharp rise in the last couple of years, while the soft-job scheme has stagnated around 6.000 jobs each year. 8 Social partnerships is one of the main mechanisms to establish a common agenda for CSR. The Ministry of Social Affairs early on in the campaign decided to invite prominent business leaders to join the debate on CSR. National and regional business networks were established to find inspiration and identify common interests and solutions. Only later were representatives of interest organisations invited to join the debate on CSR. That happened with the 1998 Law on the establishment of Local Coordination Committees (for a more inclusive labour market) in each and every municipality. These committees have an equal representation of social partners (local representatives of the Danish Employers Confederation and the Confederation of Trade Unions) and municipal representatives and are innovative in so far as municipal social policy had prior been clinically cleansed from corporative influence (cf. Larsen et al 2001; Torfing 2002a, 2002 b) . Special task-organisations have also been formed to disseminate information and best-practice and to educate and advice various stakeholders on CSR and the ILM (like the Copenhagen Centre, the National Centre for the Inclusive Labour Market and Dissemination Centre Aarhus).
The policy program of CSR in Denmark is not a single policy instrument, but a number of different and complementing instruments. And in line with the improving labour market situation since the mid-1990s, the instrumentation of the policy program has changed from persuasion and increasingly towards economic motivation programs and public service delivery. Public authorities are now to a greater extent trying to change the behaviour of enterprises by speaking to their economic interests and by alleviating lack of capacity and resources, rather than lack of knowledge (due to insufficient information and attitudes). shall take a brief voyage through the theoretical landscape of public policy analysis and neoclassical economics so as to arrive at an analytical and instrumental understanding of how public policy programs and enterprise interests can be linked.
Analytical framework for studying CSR between public policy and enterprise policy
The analytical challenge is to establish instrumental links between public policy and enterprise policy, i.e. binding societal and policy objectives to firm attitudes and behaviour. There is, however, not a strong tradition for uniting the understanding of public and private actors neither 9 This partly changing mode of implementation is in agreement with empirical findings on CSR in Denmark.
Between 1998 and 2000, the social responsibility of enterprises was found to have increased in some areas, especially in relation to retention of employees with long-term leave due to sickness or reduced working ability and in relation to integrating persons by the flexible jobs and soft jobs schemes. The reason for increased CSR was mainly found in legislative changes and changes in the business cycle rather than changing attitudes of the workplaces (SFI 2002, p.8). in public policy analysis nor economic analysis, on the contrary, the state and the market are traditionally perceived as functionally opposed by different logics. Firms are seen as rational units for profit maximising behaviour, while public authorities are seen as pursuing the 'common good' by application of regulations and neutral administration, thereby enforcing enterprises (and individuals) to conform.
In political science (and its sub fields of policy analysis or policy studies) as well as public administration, the unit of analysis has traditionally been the political process and the management and organisation of the public sector. Even though implementation research is interested in how public policies are executed and how implementing agents are performing, the private enterprise is seldom an object of study (for exceptions see Hjern and Hull 1987; Hjern and Porter 1981) . If they are there is a tendency to see them as inferior and subordinate to public actors (Hjern and Hull 1985) . However, private enterprises are equal (if not superior) partners to public authorities in CSR policies. Political processes in modern societies are often so complex and policy problems so intractable that an extensive interplay between public and private actors is necessary (Hernes 1978) .
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Neo-classical economic theory, on the other hand, traditionally sees public policy as external disturbances and impediments to the smooth functioning of the 'invisible hand' of free market forces (Friedman 1962) . The underlying idea of economic rationality presumes that enterprises have precise and operational objectives; that decision-makers have perfect information; that they can list and operationalise alternatives and objectively measure costs and benefits; and on the basis of this knowledge select the most optimal course of action. This rational decision-making model has been discarded as unrealistic and even inappropriate for political decision-making (cf. Simon 1945; Lindblom 1965; Stone 1997 ) and is also difficult to uphold other than as an ideal for economic decision-making (Cyert and March 1963) . Of course business managers are concerned with the economic viability and interests of the firm and attempt to calculate costs and benefits of possible courses of action. This is but one type of rationality. In other situations, 10 Especially since World War II, states in western industrialised countries have increasingly sought to regulate and control enterprise behaviour, while enterprises have increasingly sought to influence public policy-making. The neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1980's and 1990's which emphasised state withdrawal from the market and introduction of market mechanisms in the public sector has not necessarily meant a clearer and more demarcated relationship between the state and the market (cf. Majone 1997 (Cyert and March 1963) , stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984 ) and the corporate social responsibility and responsiveness framework (Bowen 1953; Carroll 1979 Carroll , 1999 Ackerman and Bauer 1976 ). An alternative approach to neoclassic economic theory would start from the assumption that enterprises are political actors and that public authorities are pursuing other types of policy programs than regulative or coercive programs. When the public is trying to intervene in corporate behaviour by means of economic motivation programs, persuasion programs and public activity programs, this intervention can be seen from the firm perspective as something else than 'undue interference' with firm managers right to manage and the autonomy of enterprises. The public sector may try to influence not only the short-term economic interests of firms, but also the perception of long-term economic interests, which point towards common interests in a socially cohesive and just society. 10 If future profits can be anticipated it becomes arbiter whether expenditures are calculated as a cost or an investment (Ackerman and Bauer 1976) . The firm is not a monolith operating in isolation from the political environment and political expectations. And when policymakers are addressing policies towards private enterprises, they attempt to anticipate the possible action and reaction of the enterprises and construct policy programs on the basis of these anticipations (besides from responding to political pressure of business organisations and potential rewards in terms of re-election).
10 Interests are not objective and pre-defined by the actors or the functional requirements of the 'system' or the economy. We should depart from both Marxist conception of 'objective' interests and from the neoclassic understanding of fixed preferences, which also is reflected in rational choice theory. Interests should rather be seen a continuously changing and adapting to different cognitive and external impulses. Conflicts of interests are normal and a defining element of politics. Politics is basically represented by competing perceptions of the 'common interest' or the 'common good' and by creating agreement between private and collective interests. But private interests need modes of representation and mobilisation to gain legitimacy and power (cf. Stone 1997). In turn collective interests and organisations affect the interpretation of private interests (Hall 1986 ). Firm managers for instance are not representatives of their own private interests but of organisational interests. The collective actor preference of a firm manager is therefore the result of the interaction between the definition of organisational interest, normative role expectations to the firm manager and his/her own definition of identity in the capacity of being a manager (cf. Scharpf 1997) . with a more coercive nature are effectively abandoned from the beginning (e.g. quotas, sanctions or more restrictive recruitment and lay-off policies). Second, the chosen instruments must be in accordance firm managers perception of economic interest and other behavioural dispositions of the enterprises or else try to change these perceptions. Third, in accepting voluntary participation of the business community, policy makers are accepting great variation among enterprises and even non-participation (free ride).
11 The business community hold unparalleled economic power in most western industrialised societies and political power often flows from economic power. The business community have a 'privileged position' in policy-making, both individually and through the involvement of strong interest organisations in policy formulation and implementation. In capitalist societies there is a positive social construction surrounding the business community, that it is assisting the public sector in reaching valuable goals of national welfare, economic prosperity and social vitality. Political decision-makers are generally under strong pressure to implement favourable policies towards target-groups that are perceived as powerful and as contributing to positively valued national goals (and conversely to coerce and sanction negatively constructed and weak target-groups) (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Stone 1997) . Elected politicians in democratic market economies generally try to avoid policies that discourage the owners of capital from investing and expanding production. To attain re-election politicians must generally secure economic prosperity (Hall 1986 ). The power and social construction of private enterprises, thus, set narrow limits to the available choice of policy instruments and mode of implementation. The addresses of CSR policy programs (in casu the private enterprises) have their own political interests, standardised repertoires of action and political-ideological ambitions that complicates direct behavioural control. CSR is an experimental policy program, implying that not control and compliance, but evolution and learning, should be indicators of successful implementation. CSR policies are potentials that create different possibilities for action and a need to adjust objectives and means of implementation (Majone and Wildavsky 1979; .
Therefore, implementing agents are granted discretion and flexibility in implementation (cf.
Rothstein 1998). Policymakers have a marginal influence on the behaviour and actions of private enterprises. They must seek to identify the set of decision that they can marginally influence by public policy programs and tip these decisions in the desired direction (Elmore 1985) .
First, firm adoption of public policies depend on whether corporate managers perceive adoption as economically beneficial, i.e. whether the program theory is perceived as having a positive cost/benefit relationship. But policies will not only be assessed on short-term consequences but also long-term economic consequences. Motivation programs speak directly to the economic interests of private managers; promising more productive, loyal, and satisfied employees from internal social responsibility and promising reduction -if not elimination -of the wageproductivity gap from external social responsibility.
Second, public policies are also evaluated by private enterprises on grounds of political legitimacy and normative consonance, i.e. firms may adopt policies even if they do not identify a positive cost/benefit relationship, but if the find policies legitimate, fair and justified (cf.
Rothstein 1998). Conversely, firms may reject policies on political-ideological grounds, even if they identify a positive cost/benefit relationship. This degree of acceptance, tolerance, cooperation or confrontation from private enterprises is positively influenced by the extent to which public policies respect the relative behavioural autonomy of enterprises. 12 This firm interest, however, often collides with regulative programs attempting to enforce and sanction behavioural control. 13 Persuasion programs play a vital role in informing and convincing enterprises to take on board CSR by referring to both 'objective facts', 'common problems' and common normative values and norms. Thus, the public refrains from direct behavioural control and attempts at indirect attitudinal control and self-regulation.
Third, private firms will have an interest in increasing their competencies and resources (personnel, knowledge and economic resources) in so far as these are requirements for fulfilling economic interests. As cooperative entities, as organisations, firms must rely on well-educated 12 The 'right to manage' is, however, not static or untouchable. Numerous struggles have been fought between the labour unions and the employers to determine the content and jurisdictional boundaries of co-determination and labour rights. 13 Some types of public regulation may nonetheless be actively sought by an industry, e.g. traditional economic regulation of markets (common rules, criteria for access and profits) (Stigler 1971) or a level playing field, in which the market may reward firms performing above minimum social and environmental standards.
employees, organisational knowledge, administrative and fiscal resources in order to be well functioning. Public authorities may use public activity programs to supply firms with a supporting organisational infrastructure, consultancy services, educational opportunities, infrastructure, labour etc. Thus, the public sector can compensate for lack of competencies and capacities on part of the firms, which is often relevant for small-and medium-sized firms.
This logic and the set of instrumental relationships between public policy programs and corporate interests are illustrated below (figure 3). Motivation programs correspond to (shortand long-term) economic interests of enterprises and aim at increasing the degree of acceptance of public intervention. Persuasion and regulative programmes both attempt to pressure enterprises to adopt CSR policies, but from different angles. Persuasion programmes speak to the cognitive and normative side of enterprises by using information, persuasion, manipulation and reference to common values and norms, while regulative programs speak with legal authority to enforce, control and sanction direct behavioural change. Public activity program, finally, speak to the capacities of enterprises by helping enterprises overcoming lack of competencies and resources. 
Conclusions
We need theoretically informed empirical research on the business-society relation and the external and internal impediments to corporate social responsiveness (Frederick 1994) , preferably in a comparative perspective. Point of departure should be in the idea of 'corporate social responsiveness', i.e. the capacity of enterprises for actual social performance and actions rather than process or philosophical-ethical demands for responsibility in certain areas of corporate activity (cf. Ackerman and Bauer 1976; Carroll 1979 There are no easy and straightforward answers to any of these questions. Answering them should possibly not even be done in advance, since social responsibility is contextually evolving within the framework of time, environment, and the parties involved (Sethi 1975) . This is why we need theoretically informed empirical research of the level and character of CSR in different (national)
settings. Different types of CSR approaches (cf. figure 1 ) evolves in relation to the traditions and challenges of specific welfare and labour market regimes (cf. Martin 2001) , and can probably not be exported from one context to another. Therefore, the Danish approach to CSR and Danish experiences should not be applied as 'best practice' or 'worst practice' in another context. Two analytical generalisations can nonetheless be derived.
First, the bottom-up approach to CSR, whether focussed on societal or labour market responsibilities, can easily evolve into a marketing exercise for modern and multinational enterprises, disassociated from the public policy problems, which gave birth to the concept. This is especially true in relation to integrating persons outside the labour market (social inclusion).
The incentives of enterprises for making workplaces more inclusive of persons with long prior unemployment records and reduced working ability are insufficient if the motivating force is reduced to social philanthropy. Economic subsidies and/or a regulatory framework are necessary to compensate for employers perceived loss of productivity. Increasing numbers of enterprises will possibly find the business case for performing internal social responsibility attractive, especially in a knowledge-driven economy where the size of the labour force is shrinking due to demographic changes. However, internal social responsibility will not necessarily create a more inclusive labour market. The intensification of personnel policies like life long learning, employability and job security for the core labour force may assist in increasing employers' general demands for qualifications and competencies. Persons outside the labour market may find it increasingly difficult to gain a foothold on the ordinary labour market. Thereby, enterprises presumably performing social responsibilities may actually assist in further polarising life and job chances between insiders and outsiders. This illustrates that CSR is not always creating win-win situations.
Second, if CSR is a response to common societal problems, the state and public authorities should not be regarded as any other stakeholder, but take on an active and offensive role in the CSR debate. The state (and the social partners) should not refrain from regulating the externalities of business behaviour or establish high minimum standards (a level playing field) upon which the business community can perform CSR. The state, moreover, has an important responsibility in creating favourable framework conditions for CSR, i.e. stimulating and facilitating CSR by persuasion programs, motivation programs and public activity programs.
Finally, the state has a separate responsibility as employer (creating socially responsible public institutions) and as market actor (attaching social obligations to services contracted-out or bought from the private sector), thereby leading CSR by its own example. The are by implication numerous instruments for policy implementation that goes beyond the simple voluntary-coercive dichotomy; for instance economic motivation programs (e.g. wage subsidy schemes, corporate taxes, fines or subsidies on health and safety), regulative programs (e.g. social clauses in public tenders and contracting-out agreements, social chapters in collective agreements to establish jobs on special conditions for persons with reduced work ability), persuasion programs (individual advice, certification and reporting schemes, obligations to inform etc.) and public activity programs (e.g. administrative assistance to enterprises taking an interest in social responsibility).
Each type of policy instrument should be carefully evaluated in terms of efficiency, costs, acceptance, control and sanction mechanisms and tried out in practice. Instruments can also be applied in combination depending on the problem definition and desired outcome of designers as well as the wishes and experimental qualities of implementing agents, but to define CSR exclusively by voluntary participation of stakeholders it to throw the baby out with the bathing water. Which may have been exactly the hidden agenda of actors opposing the concepts.
